The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

17. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

To doubt that God works in mysterious ways is to admit no understanding of what His will is for those who have committed their lives to Him and become His children. It is an oft-quoted Bible verse which says “…what they had intended for evil, God turned to good,” and He, Who sees all things, was working behind the scenes for the hundreds of His children in the Channel Islands in those days…even as far as whom He would allow to have authority over them. 

Not only were there Christian men like Herman Lauster working for good in the occupying forces, but others (who would likely claim little or no faith in, or understanding of, God) who were used to aid and protect the civilian population. One such man, worthy of special mention, is Baron Hans Max zu und von Aufsess, a nobleman who had been raised in the mountains of Bavaria in a magnificent castle on an estate with hundreds of hectares of forest and farmland. He was well educated in all aspects of life, with an understanding of agriculture, timber and crops. His university training had earned him a degree in law, in which he had practised before the war. A creative artist and talented photographer, he was the ultimate diplomat and negotiator.

Major von Aufsess’ understanding of men and his ability to identify their strengths and weaknesses, along with his real sense of justice and compassion, enabled him to successfully act as the mediator between the military authorities and the Islands’ civilian governments and populations in his role as Head of The Civil Affairs Branch of Military Administration.

He was an avid diarist, recording the daily happenings…military and personal…throughout his time in both Jersey and Guernsey – a highly dangerous practise! If discovered, he could have been Court Marshalled, earning a possible conviction of treason with a maximum penalty of death by firing squad. [He did in fact, for a long period of time, hide the diary behind the wallpaper (as a precaution) in the old house he occupied].

His diary, finally published 40 years after the end of the war, in 1985, gives an amazing insight into the Occupation from an ‘occupiers’ point of view, as well as revealing some interesting observations and assessments of the men who held the fate of the Channel Isles in their hands.

[Author’s note: It is pertinent to include some of these details from Baron von Aufsess’ “Occupation Diary”. Although possibly considered a self-serving record, it does help to shed some amazing light ‘from the other side’ on the Germans’ perspective and helps to make clear the gravity of the situation for…and the fragile safety of…all the civilian population during those dreadful four years and ten months.]

In a four year window of time, when:

• for most of the time the supply of every commodity needed for the survival of humanity was, at best, tenuous if not impossible;
• the fickle fortunes of war proved the impossibility of effective forward-planning under all circumstances for BOTH invaders and invaded;
• the German forces became “de facto prisoners of the British” for almost one quarter of the time (following D-Day);
• The lack of precedents for a siege-within-a-siege provided many a conundrum, for which men endowed with the famed, biblical “Wisdom of Solomon” would have been more welcome amongst those charged with administration of the situation – both military and civilian.

The Channel Islands were, in fact, under the authority of a series of senior German officers who vied with, and often schemed to undermine, each other in their desire for power.

General Graf von Schmettow: the first Commander in Chief who held the post from September 1940 to February 1945. He achieved an early rapport with the highest levels of the civilian governments in both Guernsey and Jersey and was popular with most of the officers in his own administration. Some of the more ardent Nazis, however, accused him of being “too affable and conciliatory”.

Von Aufsess observed von Schmettow as…“personally likeable with warmth of human feeling and an affability, which is probably more appealing in view of his high rank. Behind his age and high honours one glimpses the youthful spirit, ready for any joke or escapade. He has a good memory and an instinctive feeling for what is right, spontaneously and impulsively, although on this account he is more open to influence and less able to weigh a problem as a whole”… he went on further to describe him as…“undoubtedly an outstanding personality, an as individual and leader of men; warm of heart, quick of understanding, also blessed with much wisdom”…

Despite having to obey orders from Berlin that adversely affected the population and the seemingly harsh, and the arbitrary decisions he himself had often to make, he appears to have been a true provision of God’s grace for the population, whether they realised it or not.

General von Schmettow was a career Army officer, and later in the Occupation came under much pressure from elements of the Navy who had been appointed to positions in the Islands…that old ‘Navy v. Army’ animosity. There were many junior officers who had risen quickly through the ranks of the Nazi party, amongst them who, not long after their arrival, spoke out against the ‘soft’ General to their own naval superiors. Admiral Kranke complained that he was reported to be “too magnanimous” (alluding to von Schmettow’s ‘lenient ruling over the civilian rations’) and chided him accordingly.

Lieutenant-Colonel von Helldorf: a very unpleasant, less-senior officer who held a vital position of importance within the General’s office, was one of the leaders in undermining von Schmettow’s authority and position. von Aufsess noted that he …“has a coolly, calculating mind… but is all for ill-considered and high-handed decisions…[he] juggles facts and figures…and plans with audacity in a rather arbitrary and lordly way when dealing with [sensitive] matters [relating to civilians].”… He was the initiator of a scheme to evacuate all civilians to England and fight it out with the Allies for the Islands. The plan to confiscate all civilian food and fuel stocks before the first Red Cross ships arrived was also his, a scheme which he forced all the way to the top only to have it refused…largely by the intervention of von Aufsess.  (It is quite ironic that he was later involved in a plot to assassinate von Schmettow’s successor who espoused an even more extreme plan involving the ultimate fate both on Islands and Islanders.)

Colonel Heine: originally A2 Siege Commander of Fortress Jersey, was another career Army officer “…a gentlemanly old fellow, modest and with great concern for the proper conduct of affairs, but at the same time a typical military bonehead – narrow, inhibited and over-cautious…conveys  an impression of rigidity. Lack of drive and flexibility means he will undertake nothing without lengthy consideration, thus…is far preferable to a more forceful commanding officer who might rush in to precipitate action…” Heine was later transferred from Jersey to Guernsey in circumstances which did not please him.

Col. Heine, actually, lived in The Close, directly opposite Gilbert & Irene. Eventually he played a vitally important role on Liberation Day.

It seemed that the German High Command in Berlin (and reportedly Hitler, himself), had a true sense of history in the taking of the Channel Isles, when they commissioned commanders who would handle the issue of occupying British soil with a certain degree of decorum and delicacy. Later, as the situation changed within and between the armed forces and the Nazi party, the diplomatic duty of care came under threat as ideologies and necessities of war clashed.

As the resources of army personnel on the French mainland were stretched, their troops based on the Islands were drawn away to fill the gaps. As the force operating in closest proximity to them was now the Navy, it was logical that more of the responsibility for their defence should rest with them. Naval administration naturally considered their administration ought to therefore also be theirs…hence the dangerous ‘Army v. Navy’ power-struggle which ensued.

Admiral Huffmeier: Originally naval commander for the region, he wrested power as Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Islands from General von Schmettow on March 1st, 1945. He was “…a man of dangerous machinations…a dedicated Nazi…an ambitious man of unstable character. Of great eloquence…and a master of rhetoric…he belongs to that category of Nazi who are so carried away and bemused by their own oratory that they can never be reckoned to be dealing honestly with themselves or with others” (He came from “…a family of Protestant Pastors…and spoke with evangelical fervour…but on behalf of Adolf instead of God…”)

Captain Reich: became one of Admiral Huffmeier’s prime liaison officers within the structure. Described as “…a man with crafty little eyes…a narrow-minded, rabid demagogue…” Being the Commandant’s “…chief adviser and sycophant henchman…” he drew out the very worst in his Commanding Officer. He set up a network of internal snoopers and informants within the German administration and was credited with the incredible statement espousing the theory that “…with the islands in our hands, we [are] still in a position to strike a bargain with the enemy to the advantage of Germany…” made only weeks before the fall of Berlin.

(On the day of that statement, 19^th April, 1944, von Aufsess observed “…I can only attribute the idea to that dangerous Nazi capacity for self delusion… [responsible for] the similar specious argument [which] had led us to our present plight…”)

It was only four days later that Admiral Huffmeier made an equally dangerous declaration regarding his intention to hold the Islands. Largely as a result of these two statements, a conspiracy to assassinate Huffmeier was hatched involving the now-much-disillusioned von Helldorf, who turned to von Aufsess to aid in the mutiny. (The plot never came to fruition as Huffmeier had von Helldorf banished to Alderney as a result of an earlier transgression.)

The list above comprises just a handful of the men whose influence swayed the fate of the Channel Isles and their populations. It goes without saying that there were ‘many others’ who’s input directly and/or indirectly had a bearing on the situation within the lower-echelons on a day to day basis.

By May 1945, amongst those ‘many others’ disillusionment, discouragement and depression paralysed the greater number. Simultaneously, on the other hand, paranoia and suspicion drove the pro-Nazi upper-echelon into a more hardened and introverted huddle. Von Aufsess observed that the situation was ripe for a radical Commanding Officer to make a rash, ruthless ‘stand’ in the face of insurmountable odds. The ordinary soldiers however “…were hungry, mutinous…and in no mood to fight. Even if still physically able, they had lost all heart for it…”

Thankfully, due to soft words and excellent behind-the-scenes negotiation, for which von Aufsess is owed great credit, he – the man who became known throughout the entire garrison as ‘the leading exponent of compromise’ – was able to bring about a face-saving conclusion where common-sense prevailed…as we shall see.